









A comparison of the returns of 
‘Regulation 28’ compliant and non-
compliant Funds in South Africa 
 
by 
Stuart Noland (NLNSTU001) 
 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of the University of 
Cape Town Senate in fulfilment of part of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Commerce specialising in Finance (in the field of 
Financial Management) in approved courses and a minor 
dissertation.  The other part of the requirement for this qualification 
was the completion of a programme of courses. 
 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations 
governing the submission of Master of Commerce dissertations, 
including those relating to length and plagiarism, as contained in the 
rules of the University, and that this dissertation conforms to those 
regulations. 
 











The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 












The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans has exposed pensioners to a number of 
new risks which the South African government has been encouraged to mitigate through the 
aggressive implementation of retirement fund regulations. This study specifically focuses on the effect 
of asset allocation restrictions. The effect of these regulations is critically evaluated by comparing the 
long-term effects of both excess returns and risk-weighted returns of Regulation 28 compliant funds, 
to fully discretional non-compliant portfolios.  
With a population of 27 compliant funds and 21 non-compliant funds, it was found that while mean 
excess long-term return of non-compliant funds consistently outperforms compliant funds, there is 
no significant statistical difference between the two data sets. Additionally, while regulations 
successfully reduce the variation of excess returns of the compliant funds relative to the non-
compliant funds, and the mean risk-weighted performance of compliant funds consistently 
outperformed non-compliant funds during the latter parts of the scoped period, no significant 
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Retirement fund regulations have been a controversial area of global industry practice for a number 
of years, since first implemented in the early sixties. Fundamental reforms of these regulations are 
currently being proposed and implemented in several jurisdictions including, most recently, South 
Africa. These reforms have been implemented with the intention of protecting both government and 
privately managed retirement benefit schemes from drastic volatility spikes, and to ensure long-term, 
sustainable growth of all members’ benefits. These reforms have not been without opposition, with 
many arguing that they would result in a number of negative, unintended consequences which may 
potentially mitigate any benefits obtained. 
While there is no doubt that retirement regulations theoretically hold a number of benefits, Srinvas 
(1999), Queisser (1998) and Quintyn (2002) believe that their aggressive implementation may 
potentially stifle real returns and have a negligible effect on return volatility. They argue that these 
regulations distort incentives of fund managers, increase administration costs and limit member 
choice and portability in the short term. These forms of ‘over regulation’ are particularly evident in 
emerging nations, as these governments are more wary of the lack of education and experience of 
trustees, and the risks associated with certain types of developing investments and markets (Shah, 
1997).  
The objective of this paper is to compare and contrast both the quantum and variability of returns of 
regulated funds (which are a proxy for the effects of regulation) against unregulated funds as the 
control group, over a long-term investment horizon. 
This paper analyses the relevant global literature, and provides an overview of the South African 
retirement industry, insight into the risks that the regulations are aiming to address and the challenges 
faced by the various regulatory bodies. The effect of regulation on both the return and volatility of 
funds will be evaluated, by comparing South African multi-asset, balanced compliant unit trusts to 
fully discretionary, multi-asset non-compliant unit trusts, over 10-year rolling investment periods. The 
results obtained will be compared to the literature discussed, with specific findings being discussed 
further. 
Based on the literature reviewed and South African findings, an inference will be drawn as to whether 
regulations imposed on South African retirement funds are in the best interest of members in the 
long-run, or whether the limitation of certain asset classes or investments may limit the long-term 
potential return of a fund. Additionally, any limitations of this study will be noted, along with any 
recommendations for future studies. 
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3.  Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There are two types of fund schemes present in South Africa - defined contribution schemes, whereby 
an employee’s benefit will be based on the accumulation of contributions and investment returns over 
time; and a defined benefit schemes, whereby benefits are based on a combination of years of annual 
service and salary at the date of retirement. 
During the previous two decades, defined contribution schemes have become more common in South 
Africa as they shift the risk of underperformance from the employer to the employee. Most employers 
have attempted to shift their employees from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes, to 
protect themselves from the risk of underperformance. This has also resulted in defined contribution 
funds becoming employers’ default choice for newly created funds, and defined benefit funds being 
phased out over time. Defined contribution and defined benefit funds have their own distinctive risks. 
Although defined contribution schemes are fully funded, the risk to the members lies in the 
management of the underlying assets of the fund, with benefit pay-outs on retirement being based 
on the accumulated member contributions and investment returns over the entire membership 
period.  On the other hand, the risk associated with defined benefit schemes relates to the asset-
liability funding levels within the fund. The shift towards defined contribution schemes has resulted in 
members of traditionally defined benefit retirement funds being exposed to a number of new 
investment preservation related risks. These risks specifically relate to loss due to investment choice 
and market movements; and loss due to premature withdrawal and wastage prior to retirement age. 
In an attempt to mitigate these risks, governments have been forced to preserve and protect 
members’ retirement savings by implementing more rigorous legislation which strictly controls the 
industry’s structure, participants and investment choices. 
Srinivas, Whitehouse, & Yermo (2000) outline the three main retirement fund regulatory objectives 
as follows: 
• To provide the freedom of choice in selecting suitable retirement funds 
• To maintain healthy competition and portability between funds, in order to provide 
reasonable pension benefits; and 
• To limit risk through appropriate diversification and limitations. 
Within a South African context, it appears that in practice these objectives are seldom met. While local 
regulations have predominantly focussed on asset allocation and industry structure, additional 
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structural limitations have compelled employees either to be members of a specific fund based on an 
employers’ choice, or to become stuck in a particular fund due to portability constraints.  
The remainder of this paper will focus on the third retirement objective above, relating to the 
limitation of risk through diversification and various asset selection restrictions. This objective is 
mainly addressed through the implementation of set asset allocation limits that are tightly monitored 
and controlled. While there is a large amount of global commentary surrounding the theoretical 
impacts and effects of this objective, a dearth of research exists that attempts to practically evaluate 
the long-term impact of this objective on retirement fund’s excess and risk-weighted returns either 
locally or abroad. 
One study that contains a small component of the above concern is a separate study performed by 
Srinvas and Yermo (1999), on a sample of Latin American jurisdictions. This study concluded that short-
term risk-adjusted performance of certain jurisdictions’ funds was adversely affected as a result of the 
implementation of strict investment regulation in the 1980’s. Once this investment regulation was 
subsequently relaxed towards the 1990’s, risk-adjusted returns improved significantly when 
compared to the benchmark. By reducing the severity of asset restrictions and allowing portfolio 
managers to construct a more balanced portfolio, risk-weighted returns were enhanced. 
Furthermore, South African retirement fund legislation has recently been updated to require 
retirement fund managers to ensure that their funds not only comply with asset allocation restrictions 
on an overall fund level, but also comply on an individual member level. This change has resulted in 
the further limitation of individual investment choice, and increased the direct impact of asset 
allocation restrictions on the long-term effect of many retirement members’ investment growth. 
The rest of this literature review assesses the development of the South African retirement industry 
and identifies motivations for introducing stricter industry regulation in recent years. The important 
risks of the retirement industry are explored and various methods of mitigating these risks are 
outlined. Finally the difficulties encountered in implementing these methods are discussed to highlight 
the challenging cost versus benefit debate surrounding the regulation conundrum that currently faces 
the South African regulatory authorities. 
3.2 The South African Retirement Fund Landscape 
The South African retirement fund industry has developed significantly in recent years. While much 
change has already occurred, many stakeholders believe that greater change is still to come with 
increased reform, supervision and regulations to be imposed in the foreseeable future (PWC, 2014). 
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Countries and regions around the world have adopted a number of varying models to approach the 
regulation conundrum of the investment environment, depending on the stage of development of the 
private pension sector, as well as the historical and cultural conditions of the region. In South Africa, 
the majority of Retirement Fund regulations are determined and imposed by the Financial Services 
Board (FSB). The FSB aims to protect the investing community by enforcing compliance with relevant 
legislation, thereby ensuring a sound financial investment environment within South Africa.  
The South African approach to Investment regulation is similar to the Latin American approach, 
whereby a separate agency is set up exclusively to monitor and maintain responsibility for investment 
supervision. However, an effective regulatory system cannot be entirely reliant on a single, isolated 
regulatory organisation, but also requires dependable and effective supervision in other areas of the 
financial sector, such as securities exchange, currency control and insurance (Queisser, 1998). Over 
the past two decades, South Africa has developed a strong financial investment environment with a 
well regulated securities exchange and sound banking system (Tuomi, 2011). This justifies South 
Africa’s approach of delegating retirement investment supervision to a broader financial service 
regulatory agency such as the FSB, as this avoids the shortcomings of focussing too narrowly on a 
single area of regulation, while reaping the benefits from South Africa’s sound financial services 
environment. 
In terms of South African legislation, the Minister of Finance can impose various restrictions on the 
amount and extent to which retirement schemes may invest in certain types and classes of assets. In 
South Africa, these investment regulations are referred to as Regulation 28. Regulation 28 specifies 
how South African retirement funds may manage their assets, with the aim of ensuring long-term, 
sustainable and non-volatile growth.  Over the past 10-years these regulations have become 
increasingly defined, with further stringent limitations being imposed. Continuous updates and 
improvements to the Regulations are being proposed by interested stakeholders. Regulation 28 aims 
to improve the transparency and accountability of those charged with governance, by incorporating a 
number of principles that strengthen the decision making process of the Trustees.  
The main tool of the Regulators is the ability to regulate asset allocation limits. Asset allocation limits 
aim to restrict the exposure of a portfolio of assets by increasing the level of diversity within the fund. 
This leads to the discouragement of investment in riskier assets within the fund portfolio. However 
this strategy requires careful consideration, as the limitation of certain asset classes or investments 
may limit the long-term potential return of a fund. 
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Growth in South African retirement fund investments is particularly important in order to encourage 
a saving mentality among citizens. While certain juristic entities in South Africa are saving, individual 
South Africans are not. Low domestic savings rates in South Africa lead to lower growth, and increase 
the risk of falling into a ‘growth trap’ (Aron & Muellbauer, 2000). Retirement funds that show long-
term, positive, real returns would theoretically encourage South Africans to increase savings rates, 
and promote a culture of saving for future generations. A growing retirement fund industry also plays 
a vital role in reducing social equity burdens, reducing social inequality, improving fiscal discipline, 
developing local markets and boosting long-term real growth of the economy (Shah, 1997). 
 
3.3 Motivation for Regulation 
Quintyn et al (2002) outline three broad motivations for government regulation of financial markets. 
The three main reasons are as follows: 
1. Monopolistic exploitation – monitoring of market participants allows regulators to maintain 
control and ensures natural competition by enabling markets to remain at a competitive 
balance. 
2. Stability of markets – proper regulations, that consider all stakeholders equally, can play a 
key role in maintaining financial stability across numerous sectors and significantly contribute 
to the public good in a utilitarian manner. 
3. Protection of individuals – a framework of rules is able to help prevent excess, reduce agency 
costs and avoid failures of a market that is left entirely to its own devices.  
Additionally, regulators aim to mitigate the risk relating to the principal-agent dilemma, whereby 
managers may invest members’ monies with the intention of optimising a personal agenda rather than 
the members’ best interests. 
With respect to fund returns and risk, protection of individuals is the major motivation. Strict asset 
allocation rules promote diversification, limit investment in highly volatile instruments and 
theoretically reduce the risk of the portfolio.  While potentially stifling long run returns, asset 
allocation restrictions drastically reduce the risk of significant, radical loss due to market failure and 
poor investment decisions. This ultimately results in the monies contributed by members being 
invested prudently and in turn protecting their long-term interests. 
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The remaining motivations are still relevant to the South African retirement fund industry, and various 
structural regulations are applied in order to address these objectives. For more detail, refer to 
appendix B and C. 
 
3.4 Pension Fund Risks 
While a few individuals may be able to accumulate wealth without the assistance of a pension scheme, 
the majority of South Africans do not have the expertise and financial self-control to effectively plan 
for their retirement. The legacy of Apartheid on the investment in historical education for the majority 
of South Africans has resulted in a significant portion of the aging population of South Africa being 
poorly educated (Chisholm, 2012). Hamilton and Clemens (1999) show that education is one of the 
essential building blocks that increases human capital and ultimately leads to improved genuine 
savings rates by individuals. As retirement funds are long-term contracts that encompass a relatively 
high percentage of most retiree’s net wealth, the risk of drastic loss involves economic, financial and 
social implications. Accordingly, the risk of loss in the retirement fund arena requires careful 
management and consideration. 
Prior to 2007, many members – despite numerous warnings from prior research – focussed 
predominantly on returns. However, after the financial crisis, the focus shifted drastically towards risk 
management (Powell, 2009). This shift of focus was mirrored by the regulatory bodies, with 
regulations imposed placing more emphasis on risk management relative to absolute returns earned 
by the industry participants. 
Traditionally, pension fund trustees have defined pension fund risk as the trade-off between the 
returns earned and the volatility of these returns. However, within the defined benefit space, absolute 
returns are not the only consideration, as trustees are specifically tasked with ensuring the fund’s 
assets are sufficient to meet all future liabilities payable by the fund. While a conservative approach 
to asset management may result in low but stable returns, this approach may not necessarily result in 
the value of the assets maintaining parity with the future liabilities of the fund (Arnott, Bernstein, & 
Hall, 1991). The situation of the fund being ‘underfunded’ may result in members not being able to 






Srinvas et al outlines the three major areas of pension fund risk as the following:  
• Systematic market risk 
• Systemic risk  
• Agency risk. 
Systematic market risk 
Systematic risk is the risk that is inherent across the entire market and is impossible to mitigate 
entirely. While systematic risk can be mitigated to some degree through a diverse asset allocation, 
investors are unable to avoid systematic risk in its entirety. Although an argument exists that 
systematic risk can be further mitigated through the use of inter-generational risk-pooling or the 
pooling of returns across time, the majority of these policies are not readily traded in South Africa. 
Additionally, the relatively long-term nature of these strategies, together with the threat of market 
crisis, deters investors from these products (Srinivas, Whitehouse, & Yermo, 2000). There is a strong 
argument that the efficient implementation of government intervention, such as the guaranteeing of 
a certain percentage of pensioners monies, can further mitigate this risk. However, this approach may 
not be the best option as these guarantees create a moral-hazard - investment managers may take 
excessive risks in order to meet performance targets, knowing that the pensioner’s money is 
underwritten by the government. These guarantees may mitigate one type of risk, but may increase 
other types (Chang, 2000). 
Systemic Risk 
Systematic risk refers to the collapse of a critical component of the financial system that may 
ultimately lead to the downfall of the entire system. Capital markets are dependent on the efficiency 
and faith in the banking and financial system. South Africa is fortunate in that it is reasonably insulated 
from global banking risks as it has relatively stringent, well-developed accounting and banking 
standards. In addition, South Africa’s financial service sector compares favourably with most 
industrialised countries, and is backed by a sound regulatory and legal framework (The Banking 
Association of South Africa, 2012). According to the World Economic Forum Competitive Survey, South 
African banks are rated 2nd out of 144 for soundness of banks and rated 1st for regulation of securities 
exchanges (Schwab & Sala-i-Martin, 2012). These factors result in systemic risk in the South African 
Financial Services industry being considerably less than many other jurisdictions. This was particularly 
evident during the Subprime Crisis.  South Africa’s strict regulations and strong bank supervision 
ensured that local Banks remained well capitalised as they were shielded from any direct exposure to 




Agency risk refers to the risk that an agent will use their authority or power to benefit themselves 
rather than the stakeholders. This risk is often mitigated at a market level and at an individual 
retirement fund level. Agency risk is addressed via a number of prudential control mechanisms, 
including: stringent accounting policies; disclosure and standard setting; strict conflict of interest 
limitations; and strong minimum levels of diversification of asset allocation (Srinivas, Whitehouse, & 
Yermo, 2000). South Africa is supported by relatively strong prudential controls over not only the 
retirement fund industry, but also the financial services industry as a whole. This results in the 
mitigation of the above risk at both a specific fund and overall industry level, and ultimately leads to 
a strong regulatory culture within the South African landscape.  
 
3.5 Difficulties in Pension Fund Regulation 
Types of regulations imposed depend on the types of retirement scheme structures within a particular 
country. South Africa’s retirement fund industry consists of both Defined Contribution (DC) and 
Defined Benefit (DB) plans, and regulations have been designed to be applied consistently across both 
fund types. During the past two decades there has been a drastic shift away from DB plans towards 
DC plans, in an attempt to transfer the obligation and responsibility of fund performance from the 
employer to the employee. As such, employees are becoming increasingly exposed to financial 
markets, and retirement savings are subject to greater variability than before (Broadbent, Palumbo, 
& Woodman, 2006). This has resulted in the increased importance of, and further emphasis being 
placed on retirement funding regulations. DC plans are easier to regulate as they are fully funded, and 
do not require additional regulations to govern the continuous assessment of funding level adequacy, 
as with DB funds. DC plans in South Africa operate similarly to Unit Trust investments, as they are 
confined to a highly regulated environment, and have the objective of managing assets in accordance 
with a risk-based mandate, with the ultimate aim of achieving the highest possible risk-constrained, 
long-run return. 
DB plans are more difficult to regulate than DC funds, as the employer commits to provide a certain 
benefit to the member upon retirement. Regulators therefore have to ensure that funding levels 
remain appropriate, to enable the fund to meet obligations to members in the foreseeable future. 
These regulations are particularly important as they serve a dual purpose of protecting the rights of 
the members, as well as influencing the investment strategies of the retirement fund trustees. 
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Regulatory bodies also face challenges with regards to the portability of DB members’ benefits, when 
a member transfers from one fund to another. These transfers are normally case-specific and 
regulators have found it challenging to implement all-encompassing principles that can be applied 
consistently. With DC plans, these challenges do not exist, as the members are entitled to their share 
of the accumulated fund balance at the date they exit the fund. 
Regulators also have to ensure that appropriate insurance is taken out by all funds under their 
umbrella of supervision. This is more complex for DB schemes, as sufficient insurance needs to be 
taken out such that members can be paid out their benefits per the rules of the fund, whereas DC fund 
are only required to be insured against fraud and mismanagement of the plan. 
 
3.6 Regulatory approaches 
There are two main schools of thought regarding pension fund regulatory:  the ‘prudent person’ 
principle and the draconian approach. 
The ‘prudent person’ principle is not a set of strict rules that are enforced, but rather a set of principles 
imposed on fund managers. These principles attempt to encourage trustees to invest fund monies 
based on the best interests of the members of the fund, while encouraging trustees to make 
investment decisions with appropriate care, skill and diligence. Under this approach, regulators do not 
specify which assets a fund may invest in. Rather the behaviour of the fund is monitored and assessed 
as to whether it is being managed in an appropriate manner. In most countries where the ‘prudent 
person’ approach is applied, including South Africa, trustees are required to document an investment 
strategy which explicitly details the investment structure targets that the fund aims to implement. 
This strategy document will be approved by the regulatory body, and compliance with this strategy 
will be monitored by the regulator on a continuous basis.  
The draconian approach is a far stricter approach and consists of a number of rules and restrictions 
imposed by regulators on the industries’ market participants, structure, investment policies and 
performance. These restrictions usually include quantitative limits with respect to asset allocation on 
class, issuer and geographical level. These rules are strictly enforced by regulators, and any breaches 
thereof require separate approval by the regulator, or the regulator needs to take remedial action. 
Vittas’s (1998) early research into these two distinctive regulatory approaches concluded that 
Draconian regulations are more appropriate in countries with mandatory pension plans and less 
developed financial markets. Conversely, the ‘prudent person’ approach was more appropriate in 
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countries with voluntary pension plans and well developed financial markets. Vittas determined that 
all countries should adopt the ‘prudent person’ approach once their economic system and financial 
markets had become more developed. This conclusion was echoed by Rocha, Hinz and Gutierrez 
(1999), who evaluated the regulatory approach taken by countries in the OECD, Latin America and the 
Anglo-Saxon nations. Likewise, they concluded that over time, once an emerging market becomes 
more developed, it is preferable for the nation to adopt the ‘prudent person’ approach, in order to 
maximise returns to members in the long run. 
South Africa has adopted a combined approach, whereby both Draconian rules and ‘prudent person’ 
principles are applied. This has resulted in a fairly highly regulated industry relative to other 
jurisdictions. A combined approach aims to ensure simplicity in the industry, and to improve 
transparency to all major stakeholders. A strong regulatory approach assists the industry in gaining 
public trust, and provides adequate safeguards for avoiding failures within the retirement system 
(Vittas, 1998). However, an argument exists that over-regulation may introduce a number of 
unintended consequences, which ultimately could be to the detriment of the member.  
 
3.7 Types of regulation 
 
Regulating industry structure  
In a South African context, the Retirement Fund industry is regulated in terms of the Pension Funds 
Act of 1956, and compliance with this act is monitored and controlled by the FSB. The FSB promotes 
a safe and stable environment, so that the interests of all stakeholders can be met in a timeous and 
responsible fashion. The FSB is directly responsible for the licensing and registration of funds and fund 
administrators, the monitoring and supervision of funds, the surveillance and enforcement of rules 
and complaints, and research into new legislation (Financial Services Board of South Africa, 2014). 
The Financial Services Board specifically restricts the industry’s structure in the following ways: 
• In terms of S13B of the Pension Funds Act, the administration of funds is restricted to certain 
approved administrators. 
• The asset managers in which a fund may invest need to be registered with the FSB as a 
‘financial services provider’ in terms of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) 
Act. 
• All fund rules need to be approved by the FSB. 
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• All funds are required to appoint a valuator to monitor asset-liability matching, and are subject 
to an annual audit, both of which need to be performed by approved third parties. 
• Compulsory, regular training of fund trustees is required to ensure they maintain an 
appropriate level of knowledge in order to make educated and informed decisions. 
• Funds must develop and comply with a formal Investment Policy Statement, which details the 
investment strategy and asset limitations within the fund. 
South African schemes are offered by a number of administrators. However, there are neither 
regulations limiting the number of funds administered by each manager, nor regulations limiting other 
activities performed by these providers. Some schemes are administered directly by the employer, 
whereas others are administered by a third party administrator. Most of the large institutional 
administrators offer both in-house umbrella funds, as well as the administration of private funds on 
behalf of employers. The private pension fund administration industry is noticeably diversified within 
South Africa, with approximately 98 different entities administering private funds, and an additional 
45 companies that administer their own employee’s funds (Financial Services Board of South Africa, 
2014). For further insights into the rationale and potential consequences of structural regulations, 
refer to appendix B and C respectively. 
Regulating asset allocation  
The regulation of asset allocation limits in terms of Regulation 28 in South Africa are tightly monitored 
and controlled. The tools employed to restrict asset allocation are as follows: 
• Limits based on asset class (limits as to the percentage of the fund invested in equity, bonds, 
cash etc.). 
• Limits based on asset geographical location (local vs. foreign investment) 
• Limits based on a per issuer level (limits as to the amount that can be invested in one 
institution) 
• Limits based on security level (limits as to the amount that can be invested in one instrument) 
Appendix A sets out a comprehensive summary of Regulation 28’s asset allocation limits. 
Similar to legislation in many other developing countries, Regulation 28 does limit concentration of 
ownership in a particular company. However there are no limits restricting investments in 
unrated/’junk rated’ instruments. Additional guidelines are provided to encourage trustees to invest 
members’ money responsibly with the aim to earn adequate risk-adjusted returns to meet the specific 
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members’ profile, liquidity needs and future liabilities (Girdwood, 2013). These guidelines act as a 
disincentive to invest too aggressively in these higher risk instruments.  
The above rules are a type of prudential regulation. In addition to these prudential rules, Regulation 
28 imposes a number of other constraints and principles. These principles were developed in 
consultation with a number of stakeholders, and outline the way in which trustees should act, and the 
considerations that they should contemplate whilst managing members’ money. The main aim of 
these new principal-based guidelines is to encourage trustees to take ownership of the funds under 
their care, and to take a responsible investment approach that is in the best interest of the members 
and the country as a whole.  A more detailed list of these considerations is included in Appendix A. 
Over time, investment limitations in the retirement fund industry have relaxed. Limitations in equities 
and foreign assets have increased, whereas investments that were previously prohibited (such as 
illiquid private equity, derivatives and real estate) have since been approved. This has allowed funds 
to invest in a larger variety of asset classes, and has also created a large capital injection into these 
developing areas of the South African investment landscape (Loubser, Viviers, & Andrea, 2013). These 
investments are also well suited to younger members who wish to increase their returns within the 
fund, by choosing the higher risk life stage options. Additionally, other members are now afforded an 
opportunity to diversify their portfolios away from purely listed equities and debt. The relaxation of 
historically stricter asset allocation limits allow portfolio managers to construct more balanced 
portfolios, and potentially reduce the severity of negative consequences of asset allocation limitation. 
Rationale of asset allocation regulation 
The most prominent argument in favour of the strict regulation of asset limits is threefold - to control 
the investment policy of the trustees; to limit the volatility of capital flows; and to achieve stability of 
returns within the fund (Fontaine, 1997). Stability of returns within a pension fund is more important 
than in other funds, as members do not always have the choice of when they exit the fund due to fixed 
retirement ages, retrenchment, disability or death. If the fund performs poorly over a short period, 
members are not always able to stay invested within the fund until markets correct, but rather are 
forced to exit at a specific point in time. This problem is heightened in defined contribution funds, as 
it results in the benefits received being much lower than if the members had been able to time their 
exit of the fund slightly differently.  
In addition, asset allocation limits encourage investment in local investments. This reduces capital 
flight, deepens domestic financial markets and aids in developing institutional infrastructure (Reisen, 
1997). Undeveloped markets often lack liquidity in the less concentrated areas of the market, and the 
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large capital flows relating to retirement funds provide necessary liquidity into these areas of the 
market. 
A strong incentive for governments to impose strict asset allocation limits is to encourage pension 
funds investment in local government debt. In a number of OECD countries, pension funds are not 
only subject to maximum asset limits, but also minimum limits in relation to government debt 
(Queisser, 1998). These limits are not directly imposed in South Africa, however the strict, relatively 
stringent limits imposed on other asset classes such as equity, properties and commodities, indirectly 
channel a considerable amount of additional investment into the local government bond market. By 
increasing the demand for government debt, liquidity in this market increases, which results in 
government instruments being more desirable and fairly priced on a daily basis. 
There are a number of arguments that have been used to justify asset allocation restrictions. The 
majority of the considerations aim to limit the risk that is taken on by trustees. The lack of trustee 
experience in fund management is a concern in the South African Retirement Fund space. Portfolio 
limits serve to align trustees’ behaviour and encourage investment in less risky products. Limiting the 
fund’s risk can also reduce the significance of the moral-hazard problem, as trustees are not able to 
take reckless risks due to the portfolio asset class limits (Srinivas, Whitehouse, & Yermo, 2000). 
The lack of experience of the trustees assigned to manage large percentages of individuals’ net worth 
in portfolio and risk management is a major concern for most developing nations. Asset allocation 
limits tend to act as guidance until sufficient experience has been gained by those charged with 
governance. A number of newly appointed employee nominated trustees have little or no experience 
in financial services, and may not be able to interpret and assess investment strategies in the best 
interest of the fund and its members. 
Asset allocation limits facilitate a prudent approach to fund management, as these limits encourage 
both diversification across a number of asset classes and investment in lower risk investments such as 
cash or debt instruments. The foreign limits imposed reduce the extent of foreign currency, settlement 
and liquidity risks. Some fund managers will argue that these risks can be hedged away, however in 
times of high volatility this would come at a high cost to the fund. Furthermore, the majority of 
members will retire in South Africa; therefore closely matching their assets to their liabilities will avoid 
exposing them to unnecessary and unpredictable currency fluctuation risk. 
Similar to the structural limits of the industry, asset allocation limits are able to reduce systemic risks 
in capital markets, by encouraging diversification across multiple asset classes, in multiple 
jurisdictions. Regulations that limit cash investment in a single bank reduce the fund’s exposure to a 
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potential bank run or financial collapse. In addition, asset allocation limits indirectly result in the fund 
employing a diverse investment spread across a number of asset classes and jurisdictions, which also 
limits the fund’s exposure to a large decline in one of these markets. 
Strict asset allocation limits mitigate potential conflicts of interest arising between participating 
employers, trustees and the ultimate beneficiaries of the fund. Historically, employers were able to 
use their employee’s retirement fund to act as a float to stabilise and manipulate the share price of 
their own publically listed company. However, changes in the regulations have limited investment in 
participating employers and require additional disclosure of these investments. This also protects the 
members of the fund against additional exposure to the bankruptcy of the participating employer of 
the fund (Phillip-Davis, 2000). 
Adverse effects of asset allocation regulations 
Modern portfolio theory provides the most evidence surrounding the adverse effects of asset 
allocation regulations. Shah (1997) uses the capital asset pricing model to illustrate that asset 
allocation regulations hinder the ability of a fund to optimise their portfolios and achieve the highest 
risk-weighted return. Additionally, Yermo (2002) concluded that this finding is particularly relevant for 
developing countries, as the range of products is more limited and regularly traded, and liquid 
investments are scarcer than in developed markets. This has further led to ‘herding’ by various pension 
funds in developing markets. Investment managers have constructed very similar portfolios in order 
to meet strict regulation restrictions, due to the limited number of shares and debt instruments with 
enough liquidity and depth to be traded on a large scale. 
Quantitative asset limits restrict member choice, as these restrictions are applied equally across 
investors with differing ages, backgrounds and financial needs. The ‘one size fits all approach’ does 
not take into account individual member’s needs, but rather the needs of the average member 
(Financial Services Board, 2000). The current legislation encourages investment in more conservative 
money market and debt instruments. The current legislation was recently updated to apply all 
quantitative limits not only on a fund basis, but also on an individual member basis. This has resulted 
in young, risk-hungry members being forced into investment portfolios that are too conservative for 
their needs, as they are unable to invest more than three quarters of their savings in equities and 
other riskier instruments. 
Diversification within funds is limited as the restrictions applied are not in line with the optimal asset 
allocation models. This increases non-systematic risks in the funds that could otherwise be diversified 
away. Optimal risk return scenarios (maximising the sharp ratio) can only be reached at a higher point 
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on the risk matrix than is possible in a constrained regime (Srinvas & Yermo, 1999). Davis (1998) 
confirmed this hypothesis by comparing both constrained and non-constrained funds in OECD 
countries. He noted that non-constrained funds invested significantly more in the equity markets, than 
constrained funds. In addition, he compared the average real returns of constrained funds against 
non-constrained funds, over a 13 year period, and concluded that returns were 1.17 times higher in 
in the funds that were free of asset restrictions. Due to the limited number of high quality, eligible 
investments within developing markets, and the fact that asset allocation is the most important factor 
in determining returns earned by pension funds, the above effect is likely to be very costly in the long 
run.   
As funds are encouraged to invest in certain types of assets, larger funds are invested in a 
disproportionate share of certain markets in which they are permitted to invest. This leads to the 
liquidity of these instruments decreasing, as funds retain these investments for a long period of time. 
Furthermore, funds cannot trade freely in these instruments without affecting prices in the short term. 
As discussed above, this short term fluctuation in prices can dramatically affect the benefits of 
members who exit the fund during this period. This effect is exaggerated in developing countries as 
the drop in efficiency of these markets increases the time taken for the prices to return to normal. 
Strict asset allocation restrictions indirectly have a negative effect on less orthodox investments such 
as the private equity and unlisted equity markets. These types of investments play a major role in 
assisting the development of emerging nations, by acquiring foreign expertise and encouraging 
infrastructural developments, which ultimately leads to increased growth and national stability 
(Kashyap & Berry, 2014). By encouraging investment in other ‘less risky’ asset classes and limiting 
investment in the above investments, capital flows in these investments are restricted, which further 
increases their liquidity risk. This results in a snow-ball effect, as the overall risk relating to these 
investments is further increased as liquidity is reduced, which results in them being less appealing to 
other investors, which in turn further increases liquidity risk. 
As the pension fund market develops and the average fund size begins to increase, concentration in 
certain asset classes or instruments can create problems in domestic markets. This concentration can 
cause liquidity issues as a large percentage of Top 40 shares are tied up in long-term pension funds. 
As industry consensus is strong, funds tend to make similar trades in the short term due to market 
announcements. This leads to large amounts of a company’s shares being traded at one time, which 
can further affect prices as discussed above (Srinvas & Yermo, 1999). This anomaly often forces larger 
funds to disinvest in considerable stakes over a longer period of time, to avoid flooding the market 
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with liquidity and dumping prices. However this is often to the detriment of members, as this lag 
prevents the fund from acting timeously. 
Chisari and Dal-Bὀ (1996) conducted a theoretical study on Argentinian data, and found that 
regulations increase inefficiencies amongst portfolio construction. By eliminating some of the limits, 
they were able to halve the level of risk in the higher risk life stage models. In addition, they found 
that the less risk averse a member was, the greater the negative impact of asset restrictions were on 
that member. Asset allocation restrictions did not have a large effect on the Sharpe ratios of low-risk 
members. This is expected as low-risk instruments, such as money market and debt instruments, have 
very generous limits, and these limits are not normally approached by fund managers. 
High fund concentration raises the issue of shareholder activism. Are pension funds and their trustees 
experienced and equipped to manage large companies? South Africa is following a growing global 
trend relating to the rise in shareholder activism. Pension funds are specifically relevant to this 
argument. Due to their large stakes in a number of companies, trustees and principal officers are 
becoming more involved in the management of other listed entities in which their funds invest 
(Holmes, 2014). There is a lack of academic evidence available to determine whether this increased 
involvement by trustees is beneficial to fund performance in the long run, considering their perceived 
lack of experience in managing large entities. 
There is an argument that although members may be prejudiced through asset allocation limits in 
their pension accounts, they are not restricted in their private accounts. Therefore, a member could 
invest privately in an attempt to reach their optimal risk return in their overall portfolio. However, due 
to the poor savings rates in South Africa, the weak average education of the members, and the lack of 
disclosure of funds’ investments breakdown on a member level, this argument can be rebutted within 
a South African context. 
 
 
3.8 Impact of adverse effects 
The investment of funds’ assets is the most critical aspect of fund management, and earning an 
appropriate risk adjusted return on these assets is the trustee’s primary focus. As most members 
currently belong to defined contribution funds, the risk attached to the non-performance of the fund 
is borne by the members, and not the employer, as with defined benefit funds. 
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Due to the term and size of pension funds’ investments, even the smallest inefficiencies, reduced 
annual returns and careless behaviour by trustees can create enormous losses to both the members 
and society as a whole. Assuming constant growth rates, if a comparison is made between a fund that 
earns on average 10% per year to a more efficient fund that earns 12% a year, over an average period 
of 40 years, a member who retires in the more efficient fund would retire with a pension that is 61% 
larger than his/her less fortunate counterpart. This pension would be twice as large if the comparative 
advantage increased to 3% (Shah, 1997). 
The above illustration demonstrates the importance of continuous and long-term efficiency of 
performance of pension funds. The smallest inefficiencies, over the long-term, can result in drastically 
reduced returns for members. Ultimately, on a large scale these inefficiencies affect society as a 
whole. Elderly retired citizens have less to spend and may become reliant on family or the state, should 
their retirement benefits not be sufficient to meet their daily needs. South Africa is renowned for 
having one of the worst savings rates in the developing world (Duncan, 2012). These inefficiencies will 
lead to lower growth in the economy, and remove the incentive on members to add additional, 
voluntary contributions to their compulsory monthly contributions, which in turn reduces general 
savings rates. Low savings rates will ultimately further limit future growth, increase dependency and 
slow the progress made in reaching the country’s equality goals. 
Deaton (1989) demonstrates how at the microeconomic level, savings rates in developing countries 
are especially important due to the demographic and cultural structure of the average household. 
Most families are large and supported by one bread-winner, who is likely engaged in an occupation 
that lacks long-term, stable earnings prospects such as agriculture or a form of labour-intensive service 
provision. In addition, few developing countries are able to provide a reliable system that can support 
struggling citizens to stabilise their fluctuating income and employment in times of need. In a study 
performed by Ehrlich (1996), he confirmed previous studies that concluded crime is linearly related to 
wealth and savings rates. Therefore, it can be inferred that regulations that severely hinder the ability 
to earn appropriate risk-weighted returns will not only suppress savings rates within South Africa, but 
will also indirectly contribute to future long-term crime related problems within the country. 
An effective, high performing retirement fund industry is essential in closing the equality gap at a 
domestic level. Gustman & Steinmeier (1999) showed that an effectively functioning pension structure 
is essential in forming an acceptable level of retirement wealth. Cook (1995) goes on to show the 
inverse relationship in developing markets between savings rates and inequality. Kelly (2000) 
highlighted the social costs of inequality in developing markets and concluded that these costs include 
lower economic growth, hindered human capital development and an increase in crime. These 
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negative impacts are further exacerbated as the inequality gap grows. It can be inferred from the 
above, that any inefficiencies in pension wealth accumulation serve to decrease savings rates, 
decrease average wealth, increase criminal activity and increase inequality. 
The consideration of the impact of retirement regulation over the long-term is of great importance as 
this aligns the analysis with the presumed term of the investment. While many studies consider the 
short term or immediate effect of retirement regulations, a dearth of research exists to consider the 
long-term effects. This distinction is important, as the behavioural finance study by Bernartzi and 
Thaler (1999) shows that due to myopic loss aversion, investors are much more likely to invest a 
greater amount of their salary in retirement savings, if they are shown long-term returns rather than 
short-term rates of return. Therefore, the adverse effects of regulations on long-term savings will have 
a greater impact on future savings levels than shorter term positive or negative effects. 
Encouraging investment into a pension fund rather than a personal savings account raises a number 
of behavioural issues. Many individuals find it much easier to save if monies are automatically 
deducted by their employers from their gross salary before receiving their monthly salary, when 
compared to receiving the money and paying it into a separate account. As the money was never 
received by them, the negative utility of setting it aside as savings does not feel as severe as the former 
option. In addition, as access to money that has been invested in a pension plan is difficult to withdraw, 
the mental accounting effect improves member’s restraint in terms of early withdrawal. As the money 
is paid over to a separate party and mentally separated from their other finances, it is less likely to be 
spent on spontaneous luxury purchases or given to others (Dupas & Robertson, 2012). These effects 





The Fund data was manually obtained from the online system of a reputable, global data provider. 
The data used in this study consisted of quarterly returns for specific unit trust funds as well as the 
quarterly returns of the MSCI World global index.  The study period was from January 2002 to 
September 2014. The South African Unit Trust market was stratified into its main sectors, and only 
funds in the unconstrained funds categories were considered appropriate for the purposes of this 
study. This ensured that the results of the study were not skewed by other inherent investment 
limitations of mandated fund objectives or rules. As such, only funds from the following four sectors 
were considered: Global – Multi Asset Flexible, South Africa - Multi Asset Flexible, Worldwide - Multi 
Asset Flexible and South Africa - Multi Asset High Equity. 
The data was further stratified into Regulation 28 compliant and non-compliant funds. Funds that 
were not in existence for in excess of 13 years were excluded from the data set, as the study aims to 
focus on the long-term effects of Regulation 28 restrictions. This was done in order to match the time 
period with the interests of a retirement member’s investment period. Lastly, fund outliers that were 
managed differently in comparison to the other funds in the data set, for example those with peculiar 
benchmarks or alternative specific investment restrictions, were eliminated. 
The data included total quarterly returns for the remaining funds, assuming reinvestment of all 
dividends and excluding transaction costs. This data was used to calculate the total returns over rolling 
10-year time periods, together with other risk and return based metrics. 
After sorting the population into the respective groups, the resulting samples were as follows: 
• 12 sets of 10-year rolling returns for 27 Regulation 28 compliant funds. 
• 12 sets of 10-year rolling returns for 21 Regulation 28 non-compliant funds. 
The two main metrics that were used in this study, in the evaluation of the data, include rolling 10-
year excess returns, as well as the rolling 10-year risk-adjusted returns using the Sharpe measures. 
The Sharpe measure is calculated by dividing the excess return of each fund by the standard deviation 
of the fund’s total returns. The Sharpe measures used aim to take into account all levels of risk (not 
only systematic risk) through the utilisation of the standard deviation of total returns (Reilly & Brown, 
2006). 
Excess mean returns were calculated by averaging the quarterly excess return over the rolling 10-year 
time period. Excess returns were calculated using a consistent proxy for a world index across all funds. 
A world index was used due to the global outlook and investment objectives of the funds included in 
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the study. The MSCI World index was deemed as an appropriate benchmark to be used in this study. 
Gregory and Whittaker (2005) investigated various proxies for appropriate world indexes, and 
determined that the MSCI World index appeared to be the most appropriate and successful. Dimson 
et all (2008) also concluded that the MSCI index is historically the most widely used international 
market benchmark since its origination in 1970. 
Once the data was appropriately cleaned, various statistical models and methods were run to evaluate 
the relationship between the two sets of compliant and non-compliant data. These included mean 
and variance analysis, individual static t-tests, and linear mixed effect models. The significant results 





A summary of the data used in this study is contained in Appendix D and the distribution curves are 
contained in Appendix E. The initial analysis of the data involved using mean analysis over the periods 
of interest. Here the total rolling 10-year returns were compared for both compliant and non-
compliant funds. Figure 1a depicts mean excess 10-year rolling returns of both compliant and non-
compliant funds over the research period. This clearly shows that the mean excess returns for non-
compliant funds consistently outperform the compliant funds over the scoped period. However, the 
whiskers indicate a high degree of overlap between the two data sets, which is plausible as they are 
both tracking the same benchmark, and are subject to similar market conditions. Furthermore, Figure 
1a indicates that in periods from the rolling period commencing in 2003 onwards, the regulations 
appear to have successfully reduced risk of the portfolios, as the variation between the upper and 
lower quartiles is consistently lower on all of the following rolling periods of return. An f-test on the 
two data sets confirmed that the variance of excess returns of the constrained portfolio is statistically 
lower than that of the non-constrained funds over the scoped period. 

















































































Figure 1b depicts the relationship between mean rolling 10-year risk weighted returns (Sharpe ratios). 
Once we introduce the risk-weighting adjustment, the compliant funds appear to slightly outperform 
the non-compliant funds over the scoped period. Similarly to the excess returns analysis above, the 
whiskers indicate a significant overlap between the two data sets. Interestingly, while the Sharpe 
ratios mean variance below the lower quartiles for non-compliant funds appears to be greater for all 
12 data points, the mean variance above the upper quartiles for compliant funds appears to be greater 
for 4 of the 8 data points during the middle period of the study. This is most likely an anomaly due to 
the significance that the 2008 financial crisis had on the data collected during this period. As the 
market instability had a larger impact on foreign markets relative to domestic markets, and non-
compliant funds generally have a larger stake in these markets, market volatility of non-compliant 
funds would have been impacted to a greater extent during this time. 
 

















































































Figures 2a and 2b show a summary of the t-test data output, statically comparing the 10-year rolling 
periods individually. The p-values have been corrected using Holm’s adjustment, to adjust for the 
multiple natures of the tests being performed (Holm, 1979). With regards to both excess returns and 
risk adjusted returns (Sharpe Ratios), none of the adjusted p-values indicate any significant difference 
between compliant and non-compliant firms. This is as a result of the significant overlap of large 
portions of the returns throughout each time period as well as the superior performance of a few of 
the constrained funds during the scoped period. 
 
T-test Output (Excess Return) 
Period T  - stat Corrected p-value (Holm's)  
2002q1 - 2011q4 2.1767 0.3817  
2002q2 - 2012q1 2.2731 0.3324  
2002q3 - 2012q2 1.897 0.641  
2002q4 - 2012q3 1.7057 0.8532  
2003q1 - 2012q4 1.2695 0.2106  
2003q2 - 2013q1 0.9094 0.3679  
2003q3 - 2013q2 0.9643 0.3399  
2003q4 - 2013q3 0.95 0.3471  
2004q1 - 2013q4 0.8142 0.4197  
2004q2 - 2014q1 0.799 0.4284  
2004q3 - 2014q2 0.7247 0.4723  
2004q4 - 2014q3 0.7233 0.4731  









Figure 2b – Risk-weighted return multiple t-test 
T-test Output (Risk-weighted Return) 
Period T - stat Corrected p-value (Holm's)  
2002q1 - 2011q4 -0.1383 0.8906  
2002q2 - 2012q1 -0.0076 0.994  
2002q3 - 2012q2 -0.16 0.8736  
2002q4 - 2012q3 -0.2376 0.8132  
2003q1 - 2012q4 -0.6832 0.4979  
2003q2 - 2013q1 -1.1377 0.2611  
2003q3 - 2013q2 -0.9267 0.3589  
2003q4 - 2013q3 -0.7939 0.4314  
2004q1 - 2013q4 -0.7874 0.4351  
2004q2 - 2014q1 -0.6592 0.513  
2004q3 - 2014q2 -0.7193 0.4756  
2004q4 - 2014q3 -0.528 0.6001  
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The linear mixed effect model showed similar results. The mixed effect model allowed for the data to 
be expressed in terms of both fixed and random effects. The fixed effects account for the parameters 
associated with the population as a whole, which is represented by the compliant and non-compliant 
characteristics of the funds. The fixed effects are responsible for the basic trend of the data over time. 
The random effects are represented by each individual unit trust’s separate characteristics. By 
including random effects in the analysis, the population averages and estimates of variation are 
obtained, whilst simultaneously quantifying the variability due to the effect of regulations, compared 
to the variability due to the individual unit trust’s separate characteristics. The model returns 
predicted mean curves, together with associated confidence intervals for both the fixed and variable 
effects. These confidence intervals allow us to infer at which points in time the data sets are 
significantly different from each other. The raw model data depicted in figure 3a clearly shows that 
the excess return of compliant funds appear to move together as a herd whereas the non-compliant 
funds, where more investment choice is available, move more erratically, and do not show this 
characteristic in such a strong fashion. The raw model data from the risk adjusted returns appears to 
show similar characteristics. Similarly to the individual t-tests, the mixed effect model concluded that 
holding other random variables constant, there is no significant difference between the compliant and 
non-compliant data set over the period from both an excess return and risk-weighted return 
perspective. Interestingly, the mixed effect model did identify that the excess return for both data sets 
decreased over time and computed a 0.79% unit decrease in excess return for each rolling 10-year 
period. This phenomenon could be explored further in future studies. 
Specifically towards the end of the period of interest, South African equities began performing very 
well. As the majority of the constrained funds contained a relatively high proportion of South African 









Figure 3a - Excess returns raw data 
 
































































































































































































































6. Limitations and future recommendations 
As in other studies, there were various limitations that need to be considered when interpreting the 
findings of this study. The return metrics in this study were analysed without taking into account the 
additional transaction costs which may be marginally different between the two data sets. 
Furthermore, exchange rate risk, which one would expect to play a larger role in the variability of 
returns in non-compliant funds, was not separately considered. 
Due to this study’s specific focus on long-term returns (to align the term of the analysis with the 
expected term of the investment) a few additional limitations were encountered. A potential 
weakness of the analysis above is that it does not adjust for potential survivorship bias. Besides the 
obvious problem that this raises for any investigation, it could be of greater concern for a study using 
a small number of funds, where the levels of survivorship differs greatly between the compliant and 
non-compliant samples. This could be further investigated in future studies. In addition, as only funds 
that survived the 12 year period were considered, the number of funds included in the sample was 
much smaller than it would have been had all funds been included. By including these funds, this could 
increase the robustness of future studies. 
Furthermore, this study does not consider the costs of implementing and monitoring compliance with 
these regulations, on an individual pension fund level. Actuary, administrator, auditor and trustee 
costs are all increased due to the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of compliance with 
Regulation 28. Once these costs are included, it could potentially diminish returns of compliant 
investments further. 
The analysis above has one further weakness. The variability of returns for both the compliant and 
non-complaint funds is calculated on both variability above and below the mean. Arguably, any 
variability above the mean should be considered positive and any variability below the mean should 
be considered negative. As such, non-compliant funds are prejudiced for large increases in good years 
which should not be the case. Further studies could be conducted to only include variability below the 
mean as a factor of risk, which may result in non-compliant funds’ risk being reduced, which could add 






While no doubt exists as to the theoretical benefits of retirement fund regulations, much literature 
suggests that their aggressive implementation may potentially stifle long-term real returns and have 
a negligible effect on return volatility. However, other studies have argued that these regulations hold 
greater advantages in developing markets, as governments aim to decrease retirement investment 
volatility and protect members’ retirement savings from mismanagement, to ensure long-term 
sustainable growth of members’ investment accounts.  
The objective of this paper was to compare and contrast both the quantum and variability of returns 
of regulated funds (which are a proxy for the effects of regulation) against unregulated funds as the 
control group over a long-term investment horizon. Furthermore, the study was conducted to infer 
whether current South African retirement fund members’ retirement endowments are being 
prejudiced on a risk-weighted basis, by being limited to invest in Regulation 28 compliant retirement 
funds. A total of 27 compliant funds were compared to 21 non-compliant funds over the period 
January 2002 to 2014. The MSCI world index was used as a benchmark across both data sets. 
While the mean 10-year rolling excess returns for the non-compliant funds were consistently greater 
than that of the compliant funds, the significant overlap of the two data sets resulted in there being 
no statistical significance between the sets’ excess returns. Similarly, on a risk-weighted basis, the 
compliant funds slightly outperformed the non-compliant funds over the scoped period. However 
there was no statistical difference between the two sets of risk-weighted returns. 
While other international studies have claimed in theory that strict asset allocation rules reduce 
investment efficiency, this study is the first of its kind to be adopted in South Africa that practically 
aims to statistically evaluate these effects. The results and limitations of this study have opened a 
number of alternative areas for future studies to investigate. 
While a number of other studies theoretically criticised asset allocation restrictions as a form of 
regulation, this study concluded that in the South African investment arena asset investment choice 
limitations did not statistically affect long-term retirement savings, from both a return and risk-
weighted return perspective. However, regulations did appear to reduce return volatility, which 
suggests that these regulations are operating as intended by the regulators. As such, no inference can 
be drawn as to the long-term effects of these regulations and the effect of these regulations on 
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Prudential asset limits 
Category Limit Sub-limit 
EQUITIES 75%  
Equities with market cap in excess of R20 billion  15% 
Equities with market cap between R2 billion and R20 billion  12% 
Equities with market cap of less than R2 billion  5% 
Unlisted equities  15% 
Foreign exposure (excl. Africa)  25% 
African investments  5% 
CASH 
             
   
100%  
DEBT 75%  
PROPERTY 25%  
Property with a market can in excess of R10 billion  15% 
Property with market cap between R3 billion and R10 billion  10% 
Property with market cap of less than R3 billion  5% 
COMMODITIES 10%  
Gold  10% 
Other commodities  5% 
HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY 15%  
Fund of Funds (per fund)  5% 
Individual Funds (per fund)  2.5% 
OTHER ASSETS 2.5%  
PARTICIPATING EMPLOYER 5%  
Draconian investment principles 
In addition to complying with the above strict asset limits, a fund’s trustees are also required to 
comply with the following key principles: 
• Develop, apply and carefully monitor compliance with a formal investor policy statement 
detailing the fund’s investment strategy. 
• Ensure the fund’s assets are appropriate to meet its future liabilities while considering the 
long-term effect of the investment strategy on members’ expected benefits. 
• Be responsible and attempt to earn adequate risk-adjusted returns to meet members’ 
specific liquidity and future retirement needs. 
• Promote the education of trustees in both governance and investment related matters. 
• Ensure that each member level choice complies with the above regulatory limits. 
• Understand fully the nature and risks of each asset in which they invest. This would include 
performing appropriate due diligence prior to investing, keeping track of the changing 
economic environments and evaluating the impact of these changing environments on every 
investment of the fund. 
• Promote Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE). 




Rationale for structural regulation 
Structural restrictions are designed to simplify the industry, as well as grant a central governing body 
control and surveillance over the industry as a whole. In addition, the implementation of structural 
rules theoretically results in a system that is easier for market participants to understand. However 
over time, as the pension fund industry develops and the regulations become entrenched, this 
simplification of the system becomes less important. 
Limiting the administration of funds, as well as the potential asset managers who are eligible to invest 
assets on the funds behalf, allows the FSB to perform an appropriate due diligence on the relevant 
parties with the aim of appropriately mitigating the risk of fraud and error. The above entities are 
required to have appropriate controls and systems in place to ensure that the services performed and 
recorded at these institutions are in line with the mandates and instructions provided to them. 
In many other emerging markets, a trend is developing whereby existing financial intermediaries such 
as banks and insurance companies are prohibited from administrating pension funds due to 
weaknesses identified in local banking systems. The aim of these restrictions is to isolate and protect 
retirement savings from deficiencies within these institutions, and guard retirement funds from 
agency risks that are not monitored by the existing regulatory system. Owing to South Africa’s strong 
banking system, this has not been deemed a necessary step by local regulatory bodies. 
The appointment of an approved valuator and auditor by each fund, and the annual provision of 
services ensure that any turbulence within the fund is identified and rectified on a timely basis. The 
valuator ensures that the fund’s future assets are sufficient to meet its future liabilities on a 
continuous basis. The auditors assume responsibility over the fair reporting and compliance with 
relevant legislation. These two parties play a major role in assisting the FSB in identifying and 
preventing breaches of regulations by the fund. 
Compulsory and regular training of trustees is a more recent requirement of the FSB. This condition 
was implemented in order to address the obvious and severe skills shortages that were evident in 
South Africa across a number of smaller, privately managed retirement funds. Trustee training ensures 
that those charged with governance are properly equipped to make informed, educated decisions to 
manage members’ money responsibly, in terms of the limitations set out in the Pension Funds act of 
South Africa. 
By requiring trustees to develop a formal investment strategy, they are obliged, after consulting 
appropriate experts, to apply their minds to develop an appropriate strategy. This enables trustees to 
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demonstrate improved governance and limit their risk relating to accusations of non-performance of 
their fiduciary duties. Risks of the investment strategy are more likely to be appropriately understood 
and documented, with downside protection more likely to be in place and managed appropriately 
(Financial Services Board, 2000). In addition, forcing the implementation of an investment strategy 
reduces the risk of manipulation of products in order to achieve compliance with other Draconian 
limitations. 
In addition to the above structural restrictions, the FSB also performs spontaneous site visits to fund 
service providers, to ensure compliance with all legislation, and assess the levels of governance within 
the fund. These site visits are important as they encourage administrators and trustees to comply with 
all forms of legislation on a continuous basis. In addition, these visits confirm whether the systems 
and processes in place at the fund service providers are suitable to conduct fund business. 
Several other countries have much stricter industry structural regulations in place. These regulations 
include limiting the members to one instrument, and limiting fund administration companies to one 
fund each (Srinivas, Whitehouse, & Yermo, 2000). While this does improve the structural architecture 
of the retirement fund environment, overregulation of industry structure results in shortcomings, as 
member investment choice and flexibility is reduced. However, the above does mitigate the moral-
hazard risk presented by minimum government guarantees, as investment managers would not be 













Adverse effects of structural regulations 
The most prominent adverse effect of the above regulations are compliance costs, which are 
ultimately transferred to the members of the funds. In a recent PWC retirement industry survey, 79% 
of trustees indicated that compliance with the on-going regulatory changes results in additional costs 
transferred to members. In addition, 76% of trustees indicated that there is a desire to simplify the 
structure of both the funds and industry in South Africa (PWC, 2014). 
In a 2010 study, Davies (2010) found that the administration and regulatory costs associated with 
smaller funds and employers is higher than that of larger funds. Similarly, the administrative burden 
on open funds with multiple-employers is higher than that of closed, single-employer funds. While it 
is not possible to diminish the gap between the varying costs across different fund types, other 
governments have managed to encourage change and incentivise lower costing structures. This has 
been achieved by further increasing the costs of less desirable fund types. Currently, the umbrella 
funds within South Africa have not reached a significant enough size for the benefit of their size to 
outweigh the handicap of multiple employers. Ultimately, the creation of a larger, standardised fund 
will simplify the processes and lead to increased automation, thereby reducing average costs per 
member (Davies, 2010). 
The above structural constraints may serve as barriers to entry for new administrators and asset 
managers. This in turn, could result in the limitation of competition, and ultimately the raising of fees 
charged by these institutions.  However, this is not the only driver of administrative costs - factors 
such as size of the industry, development of markets and the transferability of members between 
funds should also be considered (Srinivas, Whitehouse, & Yermo, 2000).  
Due to the above structural restrictions and overall surveillance by the FSB, the industry is hindered 
by a certain degree of red tape. The requirement  that there needs to be a number of approvals from 
the FSB prior to fund rules being amended or policies being implemented, adds a significant time lag 
to many decisions being made by the trustees. This is often to the detriment of the members involved. 
Furthermore, approval by the FSB is required for a member to transfer to a different fund, which can 
take as long as 180 days to obtain (Stokes, 2010). This long time lag diminishes members’ portability 
between funds, and is a barrier that deters members from switching to a fund that is better suited to 
them. Additionally, it is not straightforward to switch out from an underperforming fund to a better 
performing fund, which limits member choice and deters them from investing their money in their 
best interest. This structural red tape limits competition in the market which may result in higher costs 













Period N Min Max Mean Std Dev. Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile 
 Compliant 
2002q1 - 2011q4 27 2.22 4.41 3.61 0.52 3.64 3.37 3.91 
2002q2 - 2012q1 27 2.10 4.25 3.47 0.50 3.50 3.23 3.74 
2002q3 - 2012q2 27 1.61 3.69 2.93 0.48 2.98 2.77 3.18 
2002q4 - 2012q3 27 1.36 3.32 2.61 0.48 2.65 2.44 2.96 
2003q1 - 2012q4 27 1.04 2.97 2.27 0.47 2.34 2.07 2.59 
2003q2 - 2013q1 27 0.72 2.58 1.88 0.47 1.95 1.63 2.17 
2003q3 - 2013q2 27 0.60 2.45 1.72 0.48 1.81 1.44 2.01 
2003q4 - 2013q3 27 0.30 2.24 1.50 0.48 1.63 1.33 1.80 
2004q1 - 2013q4 27 0.07 1.99 1.25 0.46 1.35 1.10 1.53 
2004q2 - 2014q1 27 -0.08 1.85 1.10 0.45 1.20 0.98 1.34 
2004q3 - 2014q2 27 -0.16 1.87 1.10 0.47 1.19 0.95 1.37 
2004q4 - 2014q3 27 -0.42 1.57 0.85 0.45 0.95 0.65 1.13 
  
Period Non-Compliant 
2002q1 - 2011q4 21 2.86 5.65 3.98 0.68 3.94 3.51 4.33 
2002q2 - 2012q1 21 2.85 5.61 3.86 0.69 3.83 3.45 4.22 
2002q3 - 2012q2 21 2.28 4.89 3.24 0.67 3.22 2.76 3.48 
2002q4 - 2012q3 21 1.92 4.65 2.91 0.73 2.90 2.48 3.20 
2003q1 - 2012q4 21 1.38 4.19 2.49 0.75 2.50 2.00 2.65 
2003q2 - 2013q1 21 0.49 3.87 2.05 0.85 1.99 1.70 2.28 
2003q3 - 2013q2 21 0.42 3.66 1.90 0.82 1.74 1.54 2.15 
2003q4 - 2013q3 21 0.19 3.16 1.67 0.79 1.50 1.32 1.97 
2004q1 - 2013q4 21 -0.07 2.92 1.40 0.79 1.28 0.95 1.82 
2004q2 - 2014q1 21 -0.16 2.71 1.24 0.78 1.09 0.85 1.65 
2004q3 - 2014q2 21 -0.28 2.76 1.23 0.82 1.15 0.73 1.67 
















Period N Min Max Mean Std Dev. Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile 
 Compliant 
2002q1 - 2011q4 27 0.57 1.04 0.74 0.13 0.70 0.64 0.83 
2002q2 - 2012q1 27 0.54 0.99 0.71 0.12 0.69 0.61 0.79 
2002q3 - 2012q2 27 0.41 0.85 0.60 0.11 0.58 0.52 0.67 
2002q4 - 2012q3 27 0.35 0.74 0.53 0.10 0.53 0.46 0.60 
2003q1 - 2012q4 27 0.27 0.65 0.46 0.09 0.46 0.41 0.51 
2003q2 - 2013q1 27 0.19 0.55 0.38 0.09 0.38 0.34 0.41 
2003q3 - 2013q2 27 0.14 0.51 0.35 0.09 0.35 0.30 0.39 
2003q4 - 2013q3 27 0.07 0.45 0.30 0.09 0.30 0.27 0.35 
2004q1 - 2013q4 27 0.02 0.39 0.25 0.09 0.26 0.23 0.31 
2004q2 - 2014q1 27 -0.02 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.23 0.21 0.28 
2004q3 - 2014q2 27 -0.04 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.23 0.19 0.27 
2004q4 - 2014q3 27 -0.10 0.31 0.17 0.09 0.18 0.13 0.21 
  
Period Non-Compliant 
2002q1 - 2011q4 21 0.43 1.18 0.73 0.18 0.72 0.62 0.80 
2002q2 - 2012q1 21 0.40 1.14 0.71 0.18 0.71 0.61 0.77 
2002q3 - 2012q2 21 0.34 0.93 0.59 0.14 0.59 0.52 0.66 
2002q4 - 2012q3 21 0.30 0.74 0.53 0.11 0.53 0.46 0.57 
2003q1 - 2012q4 21 0.23 0.58 0.44 0.09 0.45 0.41 0.51 
2003q2 - 2013q1 21 0.18 0.53 0.35 0.09 0.36 0.27 0.39 
2003q3 - 2013q2 21 0.15 0.51 0.32 0.09 0.31 0.25 0.37 
2003q4 - 2013q3 21 0.07 0.45 0.28 0.10 0.27 0.23 0.35 
2004q1 - 2013q4 21 -0.02 0.40 0.23 0.11 0.22 0.17 0.30 
2004q2 - 2014q1 21 -0.06 0.37 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.13 0.27 
2004q3 - 2014q2 21 -0.10 0.38 0.20 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.27 




Figure 4a – Distribution excess returns 
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